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Determining Ripeness of Substantive Due Process Claims
Brought by Landowners Against Local Governments
David S. Mendel
INTRODUCTION

Landowners who sustain economic harm from arbitrary and capri
cious applications of land use regulations1 may sue the local govern
ment entities responsible for applying those regulations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,2 alleging that the local government entities deprived them of
substantive due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 A
landowner who brings this claim - an "as-applied arbitrary and capri
cious substantive due process" claim4 - may in appropriate cases seek

1. Local governments commonly rely on boards, commissions, and individual offi
cials and employees to regulate land use. These government agents apply regulations
when they review applications by landowners for variances and special exceptions,
rezonings, building and occupancy permits, and approvals of subdivisions and other de
velopments. See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CON
TROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 193-204, 447-652 (4th ed. 1995) (presenting a typical
zoning ordinance and describing its application).
2. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C.§ 1983 (1994). Landowners may sue local governments under § 1983. See
Monell v.Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1968) (holding that municipalities
are "persons" for purposes of§ 1983).
3. See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding that application of
zoning regulations to individual parcels of land must be consistent with substantive due
process); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).The Fourteenth
Amendment states, in relevant part, that "[n]o state shall ...deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.CONST. amend.XIV ,§ 1.
4. See, e.g., Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 721-22 (11th Cir.1990) (iden
tifying substantive due process claim where plaintiff alleges that regulation is "arbitrary
and capricious, does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare, and is therefore an invalid exercise of the police power"). As ex
plained by the court in Eide, a plaintiff may bring a "facial" challenge to the regulation
as well as an "as-applied" challenge.See 908 F.2d at 722. All references to substantive
due process claims in this Note, unless otherwise indicated, are to claims alleging that
regulations are arbitrary and capricious as applied to the plaintiff's particular piece of
property.
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declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees.5 Despite
controversy among courts and commentators over both the definition of
property interests protected by the Due Process Clause6 and the stanTwo other species of due process claims available to landowners are the procedural
due process claim, see, e.g. , Seguin v. City of Sterling Heights, 968 F.2d 584, 589-90
(6th Cir. 1992), and the claim that regulation constitutes a "taking" of property without
due process - sometimes referred to as a "due process takings claim." See Eide, 908
F.2d at 721. Landowners may also allege that the government regulations constitute
"takings" of property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth and Four
teenth Amendments - a "just compensation claim" - or that regulations deprive
them of equal protection, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Eide, 908 F.2d
at 720-24 (cataloguing different constitutional claims available to landowners).
The due process takings claim and the Fifth Amendment just compensation claim
are fundamentally similar, because both require the landowner to prove that the govern
ment has regulated the property so as to deprive the landowner of all reasonable benefi
cial use of her land. The only practical difference between the two claims is that in a
due process takings claim the landowner seeks an invalidation of the offending regula
tion and perhaps actual damages, rather than compensation for the value of her property.

See Eide, 908 F.2d at 721; Katherine E. Stone & Philip A. Seymour, Regulating the
Timing of Development: Takings Clause and Substantive Due Process Challenges to
Growth Control Regulations, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1205, 1231 (1991). This Note will
refer to "takings" claims without necessarily indicating whether they are due process
takings claims or just compensation claims.

However, care should be taken to distinguish the due process takings claim from
the as-applied arbitrary and capricious substantive due process claim, the one under
scrutiny in this Note. Although both claims nominally come under the label of substan
tive due process, they are based on different legal foundations. See Southview Assocs.
v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 1992); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Note, The Applica
bility of Just Compensation to Substantive Due Process Claims, 100 YALE L J. 2667,
2670 (1991). Whereas the former requires the showing that a regulation has gone so far
that it effectively robs the landowner of the economic value of her property, the latter
focuses on whether the regulation, or its application, is "arbitrary and capricious" and
.

unrelated to the advancement of legitimate governmental interests. See Del Montes
Dunes, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1990); Eide, 908 F.2d at
721-22; Stone & Seymour, supra, at 1231.
5. See Eide, 908 F.2d at 720; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
§ 8.11, at 514 (2d ed. 1994); MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 189.
6. Constitutionally protected property interests "are not created by the Constitution
but are 'defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law' and arise only where the plaintiff demonstrates a 'legitimate
claim of entitlement.' " Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 551, 555 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). In cases involving challenges to
zoning decisions, the property interest - the ownership interest in the land itself - "is
often assumed without discussion." Polenz, 883 F.2d at 556. But in some of these
cases, and often in cases involving challenges to denials of permits, courts require the
plaintiff to prove an entitlement to a particular use of her land in order to bring a sub
stantive due process claim. See, e.g., Polenz, 883 F.2d at 556; Decarion v. Monroe
County, 853 F. Supp. 1415, 1418-19 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (determining conditions of a
"vested property right" under Florida law); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW
2.36, at 57 (3d ed. 1993) (calling requirement of proof of entitlement a "minority

§

Substantive Due Process Limits on Public Officials'
Power to Terminate State-Created Property Interests, 29 GA. L. REv. 769, 784 & n.85

rule"); David H. Armistead, Note,
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dard of conduct required of local governments under that clause,7 the
as-applied substantive due process claim can serve as an effective
weapon for landowners who seek redress for alleged arbitrary and ca
pricious behavior by local governments.8 Moreover, like other constitu
tional claims available to landowners, substantive due process claims
potentially increase the litigation costs and exposure to liability9 of local

(199S) (noting disagreement among courts and commentators "as to whether courts
should require a state-grounded property interest before finding a violation of an indi
vidual's substantive due process rights"). Other courts go even further by suggesting
that plaintiffs must have a property interest that is "fundamental." See Chesterfield
Dev. Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he conven
tional planning dispute - at least when not tainted with fundamental procedural irregu
larity, racial animus, or the like - which takes place within the framework of an admit
tedly valid state subdivision scheme is a matter primarily of concern to the state and
does not implicate the Constitution." (citation omitted)); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Pro
tection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of
Substantive Due Process?, 16 U. DAYTON L. REv. 313, 316, 346-47 (1991) (noting un
certainty in lower courts as to whether arbitrary decisions affecting purely economic
rights may be successfully challenged under substantive due process).
7. See MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 2.36, at S7 (comparing the "traditional ra
tional relationship" test with the "shock the conscience" test); Richard H. Fallon, Some
Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 309, 325-26 (1993); Stone & Seymour, supra, note 4, at 1225-27,
1231; Armistead, supra note 6, at 809-lS.
8. See Marks v. Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 1989) (city council's de
nial of permit to owner of house after town members expressed "religious objections"
to the owner's plans to open a palmistry constituted substantive due process violation);
Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 1988) (government's rejections of nu
merous plat applications, rejection of application for building permit, and proposed zone
change on property which would prevent plaintiff from developing property constituted
the "sort of arbitrary administration of the local regulations, which singles out one indi
vidual to be treated discriminatorily, [and] amount[ed] to a violation of that individual's
substantive due process rights"); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th
Cir. 1987) (county supervisory board's finding that plaintiff's proposed subdivision was
inconsistent with general plan and board's subsequent downzoning of property violated
due process), as amended, 857 F.2d 567 (1988); cf. Bruce I. Wiener, Comment, Obsta
cles and Pitfalls for Landowners: Applying the Ripeness Doctrine to Section 1983 Land
Use Litigation, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 387, 39S (1992) (opining that because of
the availability of attorney's fees and because plaintiffs need not bring their claims in
state court before suing in federal court, "[s]ection 1983 is an important source of re
dress for landowners who wish to vindicate their rights against the government"). But
see Dan Tarlock, Lacal Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its Niche?, 60
U. Cm. L. REv. SSS, S92 (1993) (commenting that substantive due process "has ceased
to be a meaningful limitation on government regulations except in abuse of process
cases and the relatively rare cases where a local government imposes land use regula
tion to cloak another, usually constitutionally suspect, purpose").
9. According to one commentator, a "driving factor" of the upward trend of pub
lic sector litigation costs is the "explosion in the non-traditional use of civil rights stat
utes - most important, section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1971 - to include
cases involving such areas as zoning and land development." Susan A. Macmanus, The
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governments and their individual agents10 who seek to implement land
use regulations.11
However, the effectiveness of the substantive due process claim as
a check on arbitrary government regulation and the related increase in
costs imposed upon local governments by the claim largely depend
upon when federal courts find the claim "ripe" for judicial review. The
ripeness doctrine, as utilized by courts in the land use context, requires
Impact of Litigation on Municipalities: Total Cost, Driving Factors, and Cost Contain
ment Mechanisms, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 833, 836-37 (1993) (citation omitted).
Litigation costs and potential liability may increase even if government agents do
not behave arbitrarily or capriciously toward landowners, because of the need to defend
against and settle meritless suits. See id. at 838 (stating that 48.2% of respondents to
survey listed an overall increase in frivolous suits as a primary cause of increased litiga
tion costs born by municipalities). Governments will often settle meritless claims in or
der to avoid legal fees and unwanted controversy. See id. at 842 (stating that 81.4% of
respondents to survey "acknowledge they settle at least some of their 'winnable' cases
just to save money").
For a description of the impact of meritless lawsuits brought against non
governmental individuals and groups and public officials, see Jennifer E. Sills, Com
ment, SLAPPS (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation): How Can the Legal
System Eliminate Their Appeal?, 25 CONN. L. REv. 547 (1993). Sills defines a SLAPP
suit as a "meritless action filed by a plaintiff whose primary goal is not to win the case
but rather to silence or intimidate citizens or public officials who have participated in
proceedings regarding public policy or public decision making. " Id. at 548-49. Twenty
five percent of these suits, which often "masquerade" as constitutional civil rights vio
lations, relate to development and zoning. See id. at 547 (citation omitted).
10. Under § 1983, landowners may sue officials and employees of local govern
ments in their individual capacities unless these individuals are protected by qualified or
absolute immunity. See, e.g., Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253 (3d
Cir. 1995) (involving developer's § 1983 action against township, its officials, and its
employees alleging violation of its substantive due process rights in connection with de
velopment of specific lots in industrial park). Although this Note generally will refer
only to the liability of local governments, it assumes that what is true for the liability of
governments often may extend to the liability of the agents of these governments in
their individual capacities.
11. For a comparison of the liability imposed upon local governments by regula
tory takings claims and substantive due process claims, see Gregory M. Stein, Regula
tory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1, 82 (1995). Cf.
Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New
Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 740-41 (1988) (summarizing
views of advocates who fear that the Supreme Court's decisions in regulatory takings
cases will have "chilling effect" on land use regulation). Professor Stein comments as
follows:
Unlike takings compensation, due process damages resemble tort damages, and
the plaintiff will have to prove her actual injuries arising from the deprivation.
These damages might include increased interest rates resulting from municipal
delay, fees for extensions of land option contracts and loan and contractual com
mitments, and losses incurred as prospective tenants seek other space. Due pro
cess damages could be substantial in some cases, but typically will be smaller in
amount than regulatory takings compensation.
Stein, supra, at 82.
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that local governments have one or more opportunities to apply regula
tions to the properties of landowners before being held liable for arbi
trary and capricious behavior in federal court. As a result, a court's ap
proach to determining ripeness has significant practical consequences
for local governments and landowners. An underdeveloped ripeness
standard - one that allows landowners to quickly bypass local
processes to sue in federal court - likely increases the exposure to lia
bility and litigation costs of local governments and individual govern
ment agents. Consequently land use regulators will become more timid
in applying and enforcing regulations.12 Hence, an underdeveloped ripe
ness standard may hinder efforts by local governments to perform regu
latory functions that are vital to the health and safety of communities
and the protection of the environment.13
On the other hand, an overdeveloped ripeness standard may pro
vide incentives to local governments to neglect the concerns of land
owners who believe they i;ire being treated unfairly. Local governments,
often vulnerable to political pressures in making land use decisions,
may violate the substantive due process rights of landowners, and then
rely on lengthy local appeals processes to forestall suit in federal
court.14 Landowners of limited financial means may not be able to en
dure the lengthy administrative processes and litigation and may simply
give up on their development plans. "Somehow," one commentator ob
serves, "a right which is only available to those with the intestinal forti
tude and economic staying power to hire counsel and pay them to con
duct difficult, protracted litigation loses some of its luster."15

12. See Sills, supra note 9, at 550 (describing adverse effects of litigation costs on
implementation of land use regulations). An underdeveloped ripeness standard contrib
utes to both higher litigation costs and higher potential liability, because it deprives the
government of an opportunity to correct its own mistakes. Increased costs also may re
sult from a greater number of frivolous claims filed by developers seeking to intimidate
local governments into approving their land use proposals. See supra note 9.
13. For a description of some of the functions of local land use regulation, see
Tarlock, supra note 8, at 555-56, 559, 575.
14. See Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial Relegation
of Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 1, 22 (1992) (com
plaining, in context of ripeness standard for takings claims, that "[d]elay has become a
well-honed, tactical weapon of the government . . . . Fueled by judicial apathy and
funded by tax dollars, government has the 'deep pockets' to string out litigation.").
15. Michael M. Berger, The "Ripeness" Mess in the Federal Courts, 1993 ALI
ABA COURSE OF STUDY: INvERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED GOVERNMENT
LIABILITY 41, 43; (discussing ripeness test for takings claims); see also Kassouni,
supra note 14, at 22 (warning that ripeness standard for takings claims imposes " 'chil
ling effect' on private property" owners, particularly those in the middle class). Even
landowners who eventually secure relief through a local appeals process may incur sig
nificant, unrecouped losses because of the delays.

Cf. John Mixon, Compensation
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Courts disagree over the test for determining ripeness of substan
tive due process claims brought by landowners against local govem
ments.16 One approach makes ripeness a nonissue; it holds that "the
very existence of an allegedly unlawful zoning action, without more,
makes a substantive due process claim ripe for federal adjudication."17
A second approach requires the landowner to obtain a "final decision"
by local authorities regarding the landowner's desired use of the land
under existing regulations. A final decision under this second approach
consists of a rejected initial application by the landowner for the desired
change in the use of the property - the "initial application" compo
nent.18 A third approach also adopts the requirement of a final decision

Claims Against Local Governments for Excessive Land-Use Regulations: A Proposal
for More Efficient State Level Adjudication, 20 URB. LAW. 675, 681 (1988) ("A contin
uing wrongful denial of development permission can generate enormous consequential
damages from loss of development opportunity, lost profits, lost sales, expired options,
and accumulated interest").
16. Federal courts agree that facial substantive due process claims,

see supra note

4, are not subject to ripeness requirements that some courts impose for as-applied
claims. See, e.g., Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 723 (11th Cir. 1990).
17. Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing
Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890, 894 (6th Cir.
1991)); see also Triomphe Investors v. City of Northwood, 49 F.3d 198, 201 n.2 (6th
Cir. 1995); Dubuc v. Green Oak Township, 810 F. Supp. 867, 871 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
Although the court in Pearson appeared to think that its holding regarding the ripeness
of substantive due process claims was following precedent, actually it was creating a
new rule of law for the circuit The Pearson court wrongly cited Nasierowski for the
proposition that a substantive due process claim was ripe as soon as the wrongful event
occurred; Nasierowksi was concerned with claims for violations of procedural due pro
cess, not substantive due process. See Nasierowski, 949 F.2d at 894.
18. See Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269, 1273-74
(8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a hearing before the public improvements committee satis
fied finality requirement, even though plaintiff had not sought a variance from the board
of zoning adjustment or director of planning). Although the Eleventh Circuit has never
expressly stated that the finality requirement for substantive due process claims does not
include a variance component, it has held numerous claims to be ripe even though the
landowners had not pursued variances. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland
Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1547 (11th Cir. 1994) ("A property owner's rights are violated
the moment a governmental body acts in an arbitrary manner and applies that arbitrary
action to the owner's property.") (citation omitted); Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin
County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1538-39, 1541 (11th Cir. 1991); Eide, 908 F.2d at 726 (stating
that it could "conceive of an arbitrary and capricious due process claim in which the fi
nal decision requirement would be satisfied with a single arbitrary act"). Moreover, the
Sixth Circuit has confirmed the difference between the Eleventh Circuit's weak finality
requirement and the approach by the Ninth and Seventh Circuits which requires a vari
ance.

See Pearson, 961 F.2d at 1215. But see Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d 1533,

1535, 1536 n.6 (11th Cir. 1995) (characterizing as dicta Eide's suggestion that some cir
cumstances will give rise to only a weak finality requirement and reiterating that ripe
ness requires a "final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the prop
erty at issue" (citation omitted)).
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but holds that the final decision consists of not only a rejected initial
application but also a rejected application for a variance19 or other ad
ministrative relief - the "variance" component.20 A fourth approach
constructs yet another version of finality; it requires the initial applica
tion and variance components and also at least one rejection of a reap
plication for a change in the use of the property, where the additional
proposed use is less ambitious than the one requested in the initial ap
plication - the "reapplication" component.21 Courts applying the third
and fourth approaches have recognized a "futility exception," which
excuses the landowner from either the variance or reapplication compo
nents if the government has made clear that pursuit of these avenues
would be useless.22
This Note argues that the ripeness test for substantive due process
claims should include a finality requirement that consists of initial ap
plication and variance components but not a reapplication component,
and a futility exception that extends to the variance component. Part I
describes the theoretical justifications for the ripeness doctrine. Part II
argues that the ripeness test created by the Supreme Court for regula19. Jn most local jurisdictions, a "variance" is an administrative remedy available
to landowners who suffer "unnecessary hardships" as a result of applications of land
use ordinances to their properties. See generally MANDELKER ET AL supra note 1, at
455-68.
20. See Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1994);
Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1495 (9th Cir. 1987), as amended, 857
F.2d 567 (1988); Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 1988);
cf. Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970, 973, 976-77 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring finality but
holding here that plaintiff need not apply for a variance or take other measures because
he had already secured a final decision on his development plans; plaintiff had only to
appeal rejection of application for building permit before claim became ripe); Taylor
Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1292-93 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring
finality, which in this case meant plaintiff had to appeal denial of use permits).
21. See Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 99 (2d Cir. 1992); Southern
Pacific Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1990); cf. Del
Montes Dunes, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1507 (9th Cir. 1990) (employ
ing "the same final decision requirement that applies to regulatory takings claims"
without having to decide reapplication issue); Landmark Land Co. v. Buchanan, 874
F.2d 717, 722 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989) ("The final local decision which must be reviewed
for arbitrariness is the decision to allow a particular level of development .").
22. For an example of a decision applying the futility exception under the third ap
proach, see Herrington, 857 F.2d at 569. For decisions applying the futility exception
under the fourth approach, see Southern Pacific, 922 F.2d at 504 and Del Monte Dunes,
920 F.2d at 1501-02. As a general matter, the landowner carries a high burden of proof
that any of the finality components would be useless. See Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d
at 99 (holding that futility exception was not met because state's Environmental Board
had indicated that it still might accept alternate plans).
According to the court in Eide, it might even be possible under the second ap
proach for the futility exception to excuse the initial application component. See Eide,
908 F.2d at 726-27 n.17 (declining to resolve this issue).
••
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tory takings cases supports a finality requirement for substantive due
process claims that consists of initial application and variance compo
nents. Just as the Supreme Court has held that a local government does
not "take" property until it finally decides how the regulations affect
the property, lower courts should hold that a government does not
"act" arbitrarily and capriciously until all relevant governmental agents
determine that existing regulations do not permit the landowner's de
sired use for the property. Part III argues that broad policies related to
the quality, efficiency, and propriety of judicial decisionmaking also
justify this same finality requirement. Part IV overcomes theoretical and
practical objections to the finality requirement proposed in this Note,
including the objection that the requirement runs afoul of a separate
holding by the Supreme Court that plaintiffs need not exhaust all ad
ministrative remedies for constitutional claims under§ 1983. This Note
concludes that, even though the finality requirement imposes modest re
strictions on litigation in federal court, the requirement helps protect the
integrity of local planning processes and satisfies concerns among
courts about their own role in land use disputes.
I.

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENTIAL ASPECTS OF
RIPENESS

Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine that courts may employ for ei
ther constitutional or prudential reasons to dismiss a variety of constitu
tional claims.23 Courts may invoke the ripeness doctrine when a dispute
has not yet generated injury significant enough to satisfy the case or
controversy requirement of Article III of the United States Constitu
tion.24 When used to ensure that a complainant has suffered injury, the
ripeness doctrine "prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of prema
ture adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagree23. There is debate among courts and commentators as to whether the ripeness
doctrine is grounded in the case or controversy requirement of Article III or is better
characterized as a prudential limitation on federal jurisdiction. See Taylor, 983 F.2d at
1289-90 & n.6 (citing cases); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 5 4 U.
Cm. L. REv. 153 ( 1987) (emphasizing prudential nature of ripeness and protesting at
tempts by Burger Court to constitutionalize the doctrine). This Note assumes that ripe
ness has both constitutional and prudential aspects, see generally 13A CHARLES ALAN
Wrumrr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 3532.1 (2d ed. 198 4), but
focuses on the prudential aspects for land use cases.
2 4. "
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. I. On the constitutional as
pect of ripeness, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5,§ 2. 4.1, at 1 1 4 ("Specifically, the
ripeness doctrine seeks to separate matters that are premature for review because the in
jury is speculative and never may occur, from those cases that are appropriate for fed
eral court action.").
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ments, "25 and hence maintains the limited role for federal courts pro
vided by the Constitution.26
Even if plaintiffs demonstrate concrete injury sufficient to satisfy
the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy, courts may de
cide that particular lawsuits are not ripe for judicial review because of
prudential concerns. These concerns are "prudential," because they are
not required by the Constitution; rather, courts invoke them at their own
discretion.27 One prudential concern is the importance of the substantive
constitutional right under scrutiny compared to other constitutional
rights. A court may "hone[] and adjust[] its exercise of substantive [ju
dicial] review" by applying a more burdensome ripeness requirement to
less important statutory or constitutional causes of action.28 Other pru
dential concerns include the accuracy29 and efficiency30 of judicial deci
sionmaking, as well as proper deference by federal courts to state insti
tutions.31 In this respect, "ripeness is best understood as a malleable
tool of judicial decision making serving a number of interrelated pur-

25. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), quoted
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 78 (2d ed. 1988).

in LAURENCE H.

26. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5,§
§ 2.1-2.4 (discussing function of
justiciability doctrines of standing and ripeness).
27. See id.§ 2.4.1, at 116; TRIBE, supra note 25, at 82; WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 23,§ 3532.1, at 115, 118.
28. Nichol, supra note 23, at 170; see also id. at 167 (stating "the 'court actually
does make a decision on the merits when it purports to choose the context in which the
decision will be made' " (quoting G. Joseph Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the
Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1443, 1522 (1971))); cf.
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23,§ 3532.3, at 159-63 (suggesting that because ripeness
analysis "may be complicated . . . by the fact that some rights are more jealously pro
tected than others," courts employ a lower ripeness threshold for claims implicating
First Amendment rights, interests in privacy, and statutory rights "affected with particu
lar public interests," such as those in patent litigation). Although Professor Nichol
seems to recognize the awkwardness of using what is supposed to be a justiciability
doctrine for substantive review, he does not "argue that this use of the doctrine is ille
gitimate." Nichol, supra note 23, at 169.
29. Ripeness helps to foster accurate judicial decisionmaking by requiring parties
to develop adequate factual records. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5,§ 2.4.1, at 116;
WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 23,§ 3532.3, at 149; Nichol, supra note 23, at 177-78.
30. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5,§ 2.4.1, at 116; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
23,§ 3532.3, at 146-47; Stein, supra note 11, at 11.
31. The concern about comity to state institutions reflects the normative goal
under the United States' system of federalism of preserving state and local autonomy by
deferring to state institutions the power to decide an appropriate range of substantive is
sues. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23,§ 3532.1, at 121 (stating that "[c]oncern for
the relationships between federal courts and state institutions may weigh in the ripeness
balance"); Nichol, supra note 23, at 178 & n.154 (citing Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 158, 200 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring and dissenting)).
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poses." 32 However, courts must balance these broad prudential concerns
about judicial decisionmaking against the "hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration." 33 Courts may not consider the institu
tional benefits of postponing judicial review in isolation from the actual
harm that may be suffered by the complainant.34
II.

RIPENESS AS A PRUDENTIAL MEANS

To DEFINE

THE CAUSE

OF ACTION: WILLIAMSON COUNTY AND MACDONALD

The United States Supreme Court has not established a ripeness
test for as-applied substantive due process claims brought by landown
ers against local governments.35 However, the Court created a ripeness
test for regulatory takings claims in Williamson County Regional Plan
ning Commission v. Hamilton Bank36 and MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. Yolo County.31 Section II.A demonstrates that the ripeness test
set forth in Williamson County and MacDonald constitutes a prudential
redefinition of the cause of action for takings claims, motivated in part
by the Supreme Court's lower regard for certain Fifth Amendment just
compensation rights, as compared to other rights. Section Il.B contends
that the Court's temperate view toward Fifth Amendment just compen
sation rights in the land use context gives lower courts reason to incor
porate a finality requirement into the ripeness test for substantive due
process claims.
A.

Williamson County

and

MacDonald

In Williamson County, a Tennessee landowner brought a takings
claim38 against the county planning commission under§ 1983 after the

32. Nichol, supra note 23, at 176; cf. WRIGIIT ET AL., supra note 23,§ 3532.1, at
130 (stating that "[r]ipeness cases have generated a functional approach that directly
weighs the importance of the interest advanced; the extent of injury or risk; the diffi
culty of deciding the substantive issues and the allied need for specific factual illumina
tion; and the sensitivity of the issues in relation to future cases, the states, and other
branches of the federal government").
33. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 1 49 (1967), quoted in Nichol, supra
note 23, at 17 4-75.
3 4. To the extent a court considers the type of alleged injury in assessing the hard
ship to the parties of withholding judicial review, the two prudential policies outlined
above - one relating to the court's view of the underlying cause of action, and one re
lating to role of the court as a decisionmaker - merge.
35. See, e.g., Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1291 (3d
Cir. 1993).
36. 473 U.S. 172 ( 1985).
37. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
38. For a definition of a regulatory takings claim, which may be cast as either a
due process claim or a Fifth Amendment just compensation claim, see

supra note 4.
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comm1ss1on refused to approve the development plans of the land
owner's predecessor in interest to the property.39 The lower courts deter
mined that the commission's retroactive application of new regulations
to the plaintiff's property constituted a taking. The Supreme Court re
versed and dismissed the suit on the ground that the landowner's claim
was not ripe for review.40 The Court held that, in order for a takings
claim to be ripe for review by a federal court, the landowner must first
obtain a final decision from the appropriate government authorities on
the application of the regulations to his or her property, and then utilize
any procedures available in state court for obtaining just compensation.
The Court's finality requirement demanded that the landowner make at
least one development proposal to the government and, if that proposal
was rejected, an application for a variance.41 Here, the landowner - a
bank - had failed to obtain a final decision from local authorities by
seeking variances that would have allowed it to develop the property
according to its proposed plat.42
39. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 175. The landowner-respondent also had
alleged that the commission's refusal to approve its predecessor-in-interest's plan vio
lated the respondent's rights to substantive and procedural due process and denied it
equal protection, but these claims were settled against the landowner-respondent in dis
trict court See 473 U.S. at 182 n.4.
40. See 473 U.S. at 1 82-85.
4 1 . See 473 U.S. at 1 86-88. The Court based its holding on finality on its deci
sions in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (decision not final until the landowner applies for a variance), Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (decision not final until landowner submits at least one
development proposal to the appropriate governmental entity for consideration), and
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1 978) (decision not
final until the landowner submits second development proposal that is less ambitious
than the first).
42. The landowner also had not shown that state inverse condemnation procedures
were unavailable or inadequate. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 1 87-88, 196-97.
Virtually all courts determining the ripeness of as-applied arbitrary and capricious sub
stantive due process claims have held that plaintiffs bringing these claims need not seek
compensation in state court to make them ripe for review. See Acierno v. Mitchell, 6
F.3d 970, 977 & n.17 (3d Cir. 1993); Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 97
(2d Cir. 1992) (following Sinaloa Lake Owners Assn. v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d
1398, 1 404, 1407 (9th Cir. 1 989)); Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 725 n. 1 6
(1 1th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court, b y focusing o n the unique language o f the Just
Compensation Clause, seemed to imply that the requirement of a state proceeding ap
plied only to takings claims. The Constitution does not prohibit the taking of property
per se, only the taking of property without just compensation. See Williamson County,
473 U.S. at 194 (citation omitted). Therefore, according to the Court, "if a State pro
vides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot
claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and
been denied just compensation." Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195; see also Eide,
908 F.2d at 725 n.1 6 ("[T]he just compensation hurdle applied in the just compensation
claim context does not apply to arbitrary and capricious due process claims" because
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In MacDonald,

decided the following term, the Supreme Court ex
panded upon the finality requirement set forth in Williamson County.43
The Court held that even though the petitioner had done more to ripen
his case than landowners in previous cases - he had submitted one de
velopment proposal and received a response thereto44 - nevertheless
there remained "the possibility that some development [would] be per
mitted, and thus [the Court was] in doubt regarding the antecedent
question whether appellant's property [had] been taken."45 Hence, in or
der to satisfy the finality prong of the ripeness test, the petitioner
needed to reapply for approval of a less ambitious plan to ensure that
no development would be permitted.46
"an arbitrary and capricious act by a government is unconstitutional even if the govern
ment pays just compensation." (citation omitted)). But cf. Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d
551, 558 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding on nonripeness grounds that plaintiff does not state a
substantive due process claim without alleging a violation of some other substantive
constitutional right or that available state remedies are inadequate (citation omitted)).
The fact that the Court in Williamson County nominally had decided a substantive
due process claim also has not affected the ripeness tests devised by lower courts for as
applied arbitrary and capriciou� substantive due process claims. The landowner
respondent in Williamson County had attempted to characterize his injury not as a tak
ing in violation of the Just Compensation Clause, but as a taking resulting from an inva
lid exercise of the police power, violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.The landowner argued that, because it was a violation of due process, the
landowner was not obligated to seek just compensation through procedures provided by
the state in order to ripen its claim. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 173, 197-200.
However, this argument only changes the claim to a due process takings claim, not an
arbitrary and capricious due process claim - the type principally discussed in this
Note. See supra note 4 (distinguishing the "due process takings claim" from the arbi
trary and capricious substantive due process claim). Therefore, the Court's holding that
the landowner's claim - even if categorized as a substantive due process claim should be dismissed because the landowner had failed the finality requirement, see Wil
liamson County, 473 U.S. at 173, 197-200, has no bearing on the controversy among
lower courts over the ripeness test for arbitrary and capricious substantive due process
claims.
43. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351-53
(1986). MacDonald involved a landowner in California whose subdivision plan was re
jected by a local planning commission and, on appeal, by the county board of supervi
sors. The landowner had immediately filed an action in California state court seeking
declaratory and monetary relief for inverse condemnation. See 477 U.S. at 342-44.
44. See 477 U.S. at 351-53 (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172; San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
45. 477 U.S. at 352-53. Although the Court in MacDonald did not expressly fault
the landowner for failing to apply for a variance, presumably no variance process was
available under state or local Jaw that would have allowed the landowner to overcome
the county's previous denial of his subdivision proposal. See 477 U.S. at 351 (stating
that reapplication requirement, like variance requirement, was means for government to
arrive at " 'final, definitive position' " (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 191)).
46. The Court in MacDonald also briefly considered whether the plaintiff had
been excused from attempting to satisfy all elements of the finality requirement on the
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In both Williamson County and MacDonald, the Court justified the
finality requirement on the theory that it could not determine whether
the government took the landowner's property until the government
fully applied existing regulations to the property. A takings claim often
demands that a court make fact-intensive, technical determinations of
the economic impact of a regulation upon a given property.47 The re
quirement that landowners first attempt to obtain relief through admin
istrative channels allows a more accurate assessment of the degree of
development permitted on the land, and therefore whether the applica
tion of the regulation constitutes a taking.48 The Court made this ratio
nale explicit in MacDonald, where it stated that a "court cannot deter
mine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far
the regulation goes."49
Regardless of whether one agrees with the content of the elaborate
finality requirement for takings claims,50 commentators accurately de
scribe the creation of this requirement as motivated by prudential con-

ground that such efforts would have been futile. The Court concluded that the land
owner's allegation of futility had been dismissed legitimately by the courts below. Al
though the Court implied that the exception would constitute an acceptable argument in
other circumstances, it held that reapplications by a landowner could not be futile as
long as the government might still permit less valuable development. See 411 U.S. at
352 n.8.
47. Among the factors the Court must consider in deciding takings cases are the
"economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it interferes with
reasonable investment-backed expectations." Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 191.
48. See 473 U.S. at 191.
49. 477 U.S. at 348.
50. Compare Kassouni, supra note 14, at 2, 11 (criticizing ripeness test as
"stretched beyond its rational limits" and complaining that additional ripeness require
ments tacked on for prudential reasons will simply "prevent most middle-class property
owners from pursuing their constitutional right to just compensation") with R. Jeffrey
Lyman, Finality Ripeness in Federal Land Use Cases From Hamilton Bank to Lucas, 9
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 101, 101 (1994) (observing that ripeness test for takings
does not in practice impose onerous burdens on landowners and has allowed subsequent
lower federal courts "to create a predictable and understandable body of law").
The Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992), generated minor speculation over whether the Williamson County and MacDon
ald holdings are still good law. In Lucas, the South Carolina Supreme Court had
deemed the plaintiff's takings claim to be ripe, even though after he filed his lawsuit the
law prohibiting development of his property - here two parcels of beachfront property
- was amended to allow landowners to apply for special permits. The United States
Supreme Court, in reversing the South Carolina court's determination that the beach
front regulation did not constitute a taking, also sidestepped the ripeness issue and did
not require the petitioner to apply for one of these permits before creating a ripe claim.
See 505 U.S. at 1011-13. This decision is best seen not as a weakening of the finality
requirement, but as a backhanded rejection by the Court of attempts by the South Caro
lina legislature retrospectively to interpose additional ripeness barriers to the lawsuit of
the landowner, who had already gone two years without a special permit option. See

Note-Substantive Due Process

November 1996]

505

cerns.51 To say that courts need to determine "how far" regulations go
is not to say that finality is required by the Constitution. Certainly the
technical nature of the takings claim, which requires courts to make "ad
hoc factual inquiries with respect to particular property, particular esti
mates of economic impact, and ultimate valuation," helps justify an
elaborate finality requirement as part of ripeness.52 But the Court in Wil
liamson County and MacDonald simply could have required the land
owners to carry their burden of proof that the applications of regula
tions

constituted takings

of their

properties.53 Instead,

the Court

mandated the use of local administrative processes as prerequisites to
judicial review.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's holding in MacDonald that finality
requires a reapplication by the landowner makes sense only if finality is
viewed as driven by prudential concerns. Once the government rejects
the landowner's initial application for development, a court would be
hard pressed to find in the Constitution any guidance on the number of
reapplications that should be required in order for the government's de
cision to be final.54 In other words, there seems to be no logical point at
which a denial of a particular application for development denies a
landowner all beneficial use of his or her property. For every proposal
that is rejected, there is always another alternative use for the property
that would preclude a takings claim, up until the point at which a pro
posal is submitted that allows the landowner no use at all. A landowner,
of course, would have no reason to submit such a proposal.

WRIGHT ET AL

.•

supra note 23, § 3532.1, at 68 (Supp. 1996); Stein, supra note 11, at

24.

51. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3532.1, at 78 (Supp. 1996) (asserting
that "[c]oncerns of ripeness, deference to state procedures, and substantive constitu
tional principle seem to be mingled in the ripeness ruling in Williamson County"); Kas
souni, supra note 14, at 11; Nichol, supra note 23, at 164-67, 181.
52. WRIGHT ET AL supra note 23, § 3532.3, at 154 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Sur
face Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 293-97 (1981)); see also infra Part III
(discussing the broad prudential justifications of ripeness).
53. See Kassouni, supra note 14, at 30 (arguing that the Supreme Court "relied on
substantive takings principles" in its ripeness holding in MacDonald; "[i]f a property
owner submits evidence that the denial of just one development application works a
taking, there is no logical reason why the claim is not ripe. The property owner need
only convince a trier of fact that lesser uses would not be economically viable."). But
cf. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 80 (using takings cases as examples where "the constitu
tional ripeness of the issue presented depends more upon a specific contingency needed
to establish a concrete controversy than upon the general development of the underlying
facts").
54. Cf. Kassouni, supra note 14, at 24 (noting that MacDonald opinion fails to in
dicate "[j]ust how many other proposals must be submitted to establish a ripe claim").
.,
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As noted by commentators, the prudential concern primarily re
sponsible for the Court's elaborate finality requirement in Williamson
County and MacDonald was its lower prioritization of Fifth Amend
ment just compensation rights arising in the land use context.SS Al
though Williamson County and MacDonald set forth the three-part final
ity requirement as part of the test for ripeness, the creation of the
requirement also constituted a redefinition of the underlying cause of
action - i n these cases a takings claim.s6 No doubt other prudential
concerns also gave rise to this finality requirement;s7 however, the ex
tent to which the Court has required landowners to pursue local avenues
of redress is best explained by the Court's temperate view of landown
ers' constitutional rights to develop their properties.
B.

The Prudential Use of Ripeness to Redefine the Cause of Action
for Substantive Due Process Claims
The same prudential concern motivating the Supreme Court's use

of ripeness to redefine the cause of action for takings claims justifies a
similar redefinition for substantive due process claims. Substantive due
process claims by landowners do not implicate rights that deserve more
judicial scrutiny than landowners' Fifth Amendment rights to just com
pensation.ss Moreover, substantive due process claims are not accompa-

55. "Suffice it to say that even the framers of the fifth amendment saw the wis
dom of enumerating life, liberty, and property separately, and that few of us would put
equal value on the first and the third." Tahoe-Si!!rra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 1331, 1338 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J.),
revd., 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1991), quoted in Kassouni, supra note 14, at I; see also id.
at 11; Nichol, supra note 23, at 165 (arguing that Williamson County and First Amend
ment cases in which the Court employed a low ripeness threshold "tell us far more
about the demands of the takings clause and the first amendment, respectively, than
about the requisites of article ill"); id. at 181.
56. See Nichol, supra note 23, at 181 (contending that by creating components of
finality in Williamson County the Court merely redefined the elements of a cause of ac
tion - "hardly the work of Article ill").
57. See infra note 81 (describing other prudential concerns motivating the Court's
holding in Williamson County).
58. See, e.g., Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1994)
(imposing "heavy burden" of proof on plaintiffs in land use context on ground that
"the protection from governmental action provided by substantive due process has most
often been reserved for the vindication of fundamental rights"); Lemke v. Cass County,
846 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring) ("I see no reason to read the
Due Process Clause as a constitutionalized Administrative Procedure Act setting up the
federal courts as a forum for the review of every run-of-the-mill land-use dispute."),
quoted in Wiener, supra note 8, at 406-07.
Fifth Amendment just compensation rights perhaps receive greater attention than
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights, but not vice versa. This is evi
denced by the Supreme Court's holding that substantive due process claims may not be
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nied by circumstances that make the landowners' plight more sympa
thetic. Broadly speaking, the substantive due process claim is another
arrow in the quiver of landowners who seek to minimize the effects of
land use regulation and maximize the development value of their
properties.59
Given the similar status of Fifth Amendment just compensation
rights and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process property
rights, the Supreme Court's logic that local governments cannot "take"
property until they have sufficient opportunity to fully apply existing
regulations provides an analogy for the ripeness inquiry for substantive
due process claims. For these latter claims, courts should reason that
one administrative setback for a landowner does not necessarily consti
tute an arbitrary and capricious "act" within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause. "Acting," like "taking," may be broken down analyti
cally into smaller steps. It makes just as much sense to say that a gov
ernment cannot "act" without considering an application and a variance
as it does to say that a government cannot "take" without doing the
same. There is no absolute point at which either government activity
may be complete and reviewable by a court. Courts may define "tak
ing" and "acting" in a manner that fairly balances the interest in quick
judicial remedies on the part of landowners with the interest in effective
land use regulation on the part of local govemments.60 Hence, a local

made if another more specific, enumerated constitutional claim is available. See Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Although Graham involved allegations of exces
sive force by police, implicating a violation of the Fourth Amendment, one lower court
recently has held that where plaintiffs bring both takings and substantive due process
claims, the former subsumes the latter. See Bateman v. City of West Bountiful, 89 F.3d
704, 709 (10th Cir. 1996). But see Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1 2 1 1 (6th
Cir. 1992) (holding that limitation on substantive due process claims enunciated in Gra
ham does not apply in zoning cases); MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 2.36, at 57.
59. See Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir.
1988) (Posner, J.) (commenting that alleged violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments "present[] a garden-variety zoning dispute dressed up in the trappings of
constitutional law").
60. This definition of substantive due process rights is in accord with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Monell v. Departnient of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), in
which it held that municipalities could be liable in damage actions for arbitrary and ca
pricious behavior under § 1983 only when the alleged violation is pursuant to govern
ment "policy." See BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1257 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]
(discussing Monell). One might argue that a statute passed by a town council which on
its face prohibits development in a particular instance manifests a clear government pol
icy. This argument is undermined, however, by the ad hoc nature of land use decision
making. See infra text accompanying note 130. Given the good possibility that what ap
pears to be a clear ordinance may be modified in practice by its application to a specific
piece of property, the better view of the Monell holding is that it requires a landowner
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government does not decide arbitrarily to reject a development project
when it creates a land use ordinance that on its face prohibits a particu
lar kind of development desired by an individual landowner. It only re
jects a project after the landowner actually submits a development pro
posal and gives the government sufficient opportunity to make a
decision on that proposal.
Under this modified conception of arbitrary and capricious "ac
tion," the finality requirement for substantive due process claims should
demand that landowners make an initial application and apply for a va
riance or other appropriate administrative relief before bringing their
claims in federal court. Courts should construe the variance component
liberally. The variance component means that landowners should be re
quired to pursue other methods of administrative relief if those methods

are more appropriate than a "variance" as traditionally conceived.61 The

variance component, which allows the locality to exercise all available
forms of decisionmaking on the landowner's particular desired use, also
requires that the landowner use all available avenues of administrative
appeal for an adverse decision on an initial application.62 Courts that al
ready require an initial application and an application for a variance63
recognize the importance of allowing multiple government actors to
participate in a land use decision before calling the decision "final. "64

to submit an initial application and an application for a variance, see infra text accom
panying notes 61 -64, in order to ascertain the true governmental "policy" with respect
to her property.
61. See Wiener, supra note 8, at 392 (broadly referring to the variance requirement
set forth in Williamson County as the "administrative relief element"). Other forms of
administrative relief include a special exception, a special use permit, and a conditional
use. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1 , at 468-76 (distinguishing these forms of
administrative relief from a variance).
62. See Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970, 976 (3d Cir. 1 993) (holding unripe sub
stantive due process claim arising out of denial of building permit, where development
plan had already been approved by state, on ground that plaintiff had not appealed to
Board of Adjustment); Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1289
(3d Cir. 1 993) (holding unripe substantive due process claim arising out of revocation
of lessor's permit on ground that plaintiff failed to reapply for use permit, appeal the
revocation decision to the Township Zoning Hearing Board, or seek a variance or spe
cial exception); cf. Bateman, 89 F.3d at 706-07 (holding plaintiff 's takings claim unripe
on ground that landowner failed to appeal to the Board of Adjustment and seek "a vari
ance or waiver" from the certificate of noncompliance issued by government
employee).
63. See cases cited supra note 20.
64. The Third Circuit has stated that the Supreme Court's decisions in Williamson
County and MacDonald, "[i]n the context of land use decisions . . . require state zoning
authorities be given an opportunity to 'arrive[] at a final, definitive position regarding
how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question' before its
owner has a ripe constitutional challenge based on the disputed decision." Taylor, 983
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Some courts, however, have argued that the finality requirement
has no bearing at all on substantive due process claims.65 This logic has
allowed a substantive due process claim to be ripe for review when the
town zoning board had not yet issued a decision on the variances re
quested by the developer.66 This approach ignores the analogy that
lower courts should make to the Supreme Court's holdings in William
son County and MacDonald.
The same criticism can be made, albeit to a lesser extent, of courts
that require an initial application for a development proposal but no ap
plication for a variance.67 Even though these courts recognize the im
portance of the finality

requirement for substantive due

process

claims,68 their version of finality potentially deprives the local govern
ment of opportunities to consider fully the landowner's desired use. It

therefore contradicts the notion that a unitary government action, at

F.2d at 1291 (quoting Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v. Hamilton
Banlc, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985)) (alteration in original).
65. See Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 121 1 (6th Cir. 1992); cases cited
supra note 17. In Pearson, the Sixth Circuit held that a substantive due process claim
arising from a "routine denial of a zoning change," 961 F.2d at 1213, by a small
defendant city in Michigan was ripe for review without an application for a variance or
other administrative relief. After the city council had rejected the plaintiff 's rezoning
application, as well as an amended site plan and additional zoning request, the plaintiff
had brought suit alleging that the rejection was arbitrary and capricious, depriving him
of substantive due process of law. See 961 F.2d at 1214. The court could have held that
the complaint met at least a lenient version of the finality rule, although the plaintiff
had not applied for a variance and hence could not satisfy the Ninth Circuit's "stricter
test" - despite a statement by the Pearson court to the contrary. Instead, the court rea
soned that in as-applied substantive due process claims, where there was no need to de
cide whether the plaintiff 's property had ·been taken and whether he had been denied
just compensation, an easier ripeness standard was to be applied. See 961 F.2d at 1215.
For commentary supporting the Sixth Circuit's position, see Kassouni, supra note 14, at
46; Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A Survey of Deci
sions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use
Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 9 1 , 9 1 n.l (1994).
66. See Dubuc v. Green Oak Township, 810 F. Supp. 867, 871 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
The landowner in Dubuc complained that the zoning board of appeals intentionally
delayed making a decision on the application for a variance. The court, following Pear
son, held that a variance was not required. However, the ·requirement that the board of
appeals make a final decision would not have put the landowner in a "catch 22," as the
court suggested, see 810 F. Supp. at 871 n.2, because the landowner still could have
proven that seeking a final decision would have been futile. Other courts in the Sixth
Circuit have also confirmed the approach in Pearson that ignores finality for substantive
due process claims. See Millington Homes Investors, Ltd. v. City of Millington, No. 945482, 1995 WL 394143, at *8 (6th Cir. July 3, 1995).
67. See cases cited supra note 18.
68. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 725 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (reasoning
that finality requires at least one application by landowner because, "[i]f the authority
has not reached a final decision with regard to the application of the regulation to the
landowner's property . . . in effect, a decision has not yet been made").
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least in the land use context, should be defined to include participation
by all relevant agents. This least stringent finality test also creates a
greater chance for confusion among courts as to which decision by the
government is "final." A good example of this confusion occurs in
Resolution Trust Corp . v. Town ofHighland Beach.69 T here the Eleventh
Circuit first asserted that a "property owner 's rights are violated the
moment a governmental body acts in an arbitrary manner and applies
that arbitrary action to the owner's property."70 Then, in an apparent
bow to the finality requirement, the court determined that the plaintiff's
injury occurred when the town reinterpreted an ordinance, "halting the
completion of the [plaintiff's] project, and made it clear it would not
compromise its reinterpretation that denied the joint venture . . . the

benefit of its vested rights. "71 Presumably , a decision is final when it is
"clear," but the court does not explain what distinguishes a clear deci
sion from an unclear one.
However, even a very broad conception of government action can

not justify requiring a landowner, in order to obtain a final decision on
her original development proposal, to give regulatory authorities the op
portunity to consider a different, less ambitious development proposal.72
The central inquiry in a substantive due process claim is whether the
government acted arbitrarily and capriciously, not whether the govern
ment took the landowner 's property. A reapplication requirement might
make sense when courts must determine whether the government has
deprived the landowner of all beneficial use of her property. But where
the landowner alleges that existing regulations entitled her to approval
of her first application, then the question of whether further develop
ment would be allowed is irrelevant.73 Courts holding that finality for

69. 18 F.3d 1536 (11th Cir. 1994).
70. 18 F.3d at 1547.
71. 18 F.3d at 1547 (emphasis added).
72. For cases applying the reapplication component to substantive due process
claims, see supra note 21.
73. See, e.g., Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1988)
(distinguishing MacDonald's reapplication requirement intended "to determine the ex
act permitted level of development" as unique to takings claims), amending 834 F.2d
1488 (9th Cir. 1987); cf. Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 725 n.16 (11th Cir.
1990) (distinguishing the requirement that the zoning decision "be finally made and ap
plied to the property" from the requirement that the local authority make "all other de
cisions necessary for the court to determine whether the landowner has been deprived of
substantially all economically beneficial value of the property").
The Ninth Circuit in Herrington had issued an earlier opinion, amended by the
opinion cited above, that more explicitly denied the relevance of the MacDonald reap
plication requirement to substantive due process claims. See 834 F.2d at 1497. How
ever, it does not appear from the amended opinion that the Ninth Circuit changed its
view that the MacDonald reapplication requirement is uniquely tailored to the claim al-
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substantive due process claims requires a t least one reapplication by the
landowner have failed to justify coherently this standard.74
In addition, if after submitting an initial application it would be fu
tile for the landowner to pursue a decision on this application, appeal an
adverse decision, or apply for a variance, the landowner should be ex
cused from doing so. T his futility exception, adopted by virtually all
circuits, provides justice to landowners who cannot use existing admin
istrative processes because of the unwarranted manipulation of these
processes by government agents.75 T he futility exception also allows
landowners to bypass the variance component when the government of
fers no such procedure for the type of application sought.76 In this way,
courts can accommodate the many differences among land use ordi
nances. Finally, in exceptional circumstances, the futility exception may
excuse the pursuit of certain components of finality when the govern-

leging a deprivation of substantially all economically viable use of property. For a dif
ferent reading of the amended opinion, see MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 161
(claiming that Ninth Circuit applied ripeness rules from takings cases in amended opin
ion but not in first opinion).
74. This failure is illustrated by the Second Circuit's decision in Southview Associ
ates v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992), which involved a developer whose appli
cation for a building permit for a residential subdivision - already downsized to ac
commodate a deeryard which the developer discovered after purchasing the land - was
denied by Vermont's District ill Environmental Commission on the ground that the pro
posed development violated the state's growth control regulations. After unsuccessful
appeals before Vermont's Environmental Board and Supreme Court, the developer sued
the Board's individual members under § 1983. See 980 F.2d at 87-92.
The Second Circuit held that Southview was required to submit at least one more
development application to the state in order for the claim to be ripe for review. Al
though the Vermont Environmental Board had applied state regulations "to the one par
ticular subdivision proposal in question, it [had] yet to provide a 'final, definitive posi
tion regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in
question.' " 980 F.2d at 99 (quoting Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191 ( 1985)). However, in attempting to explain why a
reapplication was required, the Southview court's only suggestion was that unless it had
"a final decision before it, it [could not] determine whether a claimant was deprived of
property and whether the government conduct was arbitrary and capricious." 980 F.2d
at 97. This argument is unpersuasive, if not disingenuous. Southview could have sus
tained a loss of a property interest if it was unjustly denied an opportunity to develop
according to existing regulations. Also, the court did not need the benefit of knowing
the fate of reapplications by Southview in order to determine whether the decision on
the first application was arbitrary and capricious.
75. For example, the government might unjustifiably delay consideration of an ap
plication for development, hence making it impossible for the landowner to secure a re
jection and proceed to satisfy the finality requirement. See, e.g., Dubuc v. Green Oak
Township, 810 F. Supp. 867, 869 (6th Cir. 1992).
76. See Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1232 n.4 (9th Cir.
1994); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1 988).
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ment unambiguously states at an early stage that it will not allow the
landowner's desired use.n
ill.

RIPENESS AS A PRUDENTIAL TOOL OF JUDICIAL

DECISIONMAKING: BROAD POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR REQUIRING
LANDOWNERS TO OBTAIN A FINAL DECISION
Prudential concerns about the institutional capacity of federal
courts to decide substantive due process claims further support the in
corporation of a finality requirement into the ripeness test for these
claims. These additional prudential concerns include the accuracy, effi
ciency, and propriety of federal judicial decisionmaking at a given point
in time. They should be distinguished from the prudential concern about
the relative importance of the underlying cause of action78 because they
broadly apply to all instances of judicial decisionmaking.79 However,
even though prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking do not
depend directly on the cause of action, substantive due process claims
brought by landowners typically involve factual circumstances that ac
centuate these concerns. Courts deciding substantive due process claims
brought by landowners face the unpleasant task of interposing their
bulky judicial apparatus on conflicts that are local and usually political
in nature. They must resolve highly contextual questions such as what
constitutes arbitrary and capricious conduct and what constitutes an ap
propriate remedy for the landowner. Hence, even if lower courts chose

to ignore the Supreme Court's flexible view of property rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments80 - and declined to adopt a ripeness
test for substantive due process claims derived from Williamson County

77. See Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 504
(9th Cir. 1990); He"ington, 857 F.2d at 570 (basing exercise of futility exception on
government testimony that "the only means of obtaining approval of [plaintiff's] 32-lot
proposal was through a General Plan amendment"). However, in no case should the fu
tility exception excuse the submission of an initial development application. See, e.g.,
Kawaoka, 17 F.3d at 1232; Southern Pacific, 922 F.2d at 504.
78. See supra Part II.
79. See Nichol, supra note 23, at 176.
80. One commentator expressed this view as follows:
While freedom of speech is a fundamental constitutional right, there is no legal,
moral, or prudential reason to grant it preferential status. Other constitutional
rights, such as the right of just compensation for a taking of private property, are
also worthy of judicial solicitude. As the Supreme Court once remarked in a dis
cussion of standing requirements, "we know of no principled basis on which to
create a hierarchy of constitutional values or a complementary 'sliding scale' of
standing which might . . . invoke the judicial power of the United States."
Kassouni, supra note 14, at I O (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1 982)).
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they still would have to consider these additional

prudential concerns and postpone decisionmaking accordingly.
The difference between the concern about the underlying cause of
action and broad concerns about judicial decisionmaking can be ex
pressed in another way. The redefinition of the substantive due process
cause of action turns ripeness into an inquiry that asks whether the al
legedly arbitrary and capricious act has yet occurred. Courts must deter
mine whether the government has indeed "acted " in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. By contrast, a ripeness standard driven by broad
concerns about judicial decisionmaking is founded on the notion that,
irrespective of whether the government has yet acted, courts should
postpone deciding a case until they are competent or until it is wise to
do so.8 1
Unfortunately, although broad prudential concerns about judicial

decisionmaking have affected lower courts' ripeness decision�' for sub
stantive due process claims, the courts have neither fully identified
these concerns nor systematically explained their importance. Rather, in
a given case, a court typically makes isolated, somewhat unfocused ref
erences to only one or two of these concerns. Section ill.A identifies

four separate prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking that
justify applying the finality requirement to substantive due process
claims: the ability of courts to determine arbitrary and capricious behav
ior, the ability of courts to fashion remedies, comity to state institutioqs,
and judicial economy. This section also explains why each of these pru
dential concerns provides less support for the reapplication component
of finality than for the initial application and variance components. Sec
tion ill.B argues that landowners should have to satisfy the initial appli-

81. In this respect, prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking are intended
to stand as a justification for finality that is independent of the prudential concern about
the underlying cause of action - and the analogy to the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Williamson County and MacDonald that the government does not "take" property until
it makes a final decision - explicated supra, Part II.
On the other hand, these two types of prudential concerns justifying ripeness are
not mutually exclusive. The Supreme Court in MacDonald made reference, albeit brief,
to prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking when it took note of the inherent
flexibility of local agencies that make land use decisions. See MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 350 ( 1986) (" [L]ocal agencies charged with ad
ministering regulations governing property development are singularly flexible institu
tions; what they take with one hand they may give back with the other."). This mention
of flexibility introduces concerns about the competence and economy of federal courts
compared to state institutions. Moreover, to the extent the Supreme Court justified its
takings ripeness test on the need for a more developed factual record, it based this test
on a concern about judicial decisionmaking. Hence, it is possible for an amalgam of
prudential concerns to justify the ripeness standard employed by courts for substantive
due process claims.
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cation and variance components in order to make their substantive due
process claims ripe for review, but for fairness reasons should not have
to satisfy the reapplication component.
A.

1.

Four Prudential Concerns

Ability of Courts to Ascertain Injury

Courts may turn to the ripeness doctrine because they question
their ability to decide certain issues at a particular point in time without
a more developed factual record. This is especially true for substantive
due process claims, where the issue is whether the government's behav
ior may be characterized as " arbitrary and capricious. " Given the
highly contextual nature of the local land use decisionmaking process
- complicated · further by the large variety of land use ordinances courts need a well-developed record to put the defendant's behavior into

perspective.82

A finality requirement that includes the initial application and vari
ance components helps satisfy the concern about the ability of courts to
assess injury to landowners. In the event litigation ensues, courts benefit
from an improved factual record that shows some degree of concrete
harm to the landowner. Courts can better assess whether the govern
ment's actions, taken as a whole, were sufficiently egregious to consti
tute arbitrary and capricious behavior.
However, the concern about a court's ability to assess injury does
not strongly justify a finality requirement that also includes a reapplica
tion requirement. The reapplication component would continue to im
prove the factual record that eventually comes before the court because
it would mandate at least one more instance of government decision
making. But this continued improvement likely would be marginal,
given that the government has had sufficient opportunity - through the
initial application and variance components - to decide on the land
owner's originally desired use.

82. According to Professor Stein:
The need for concrete facts is acute in land use Jaw, where so much litigation
arises out of local ordinances about which there may be little reported case law.
With a wide variety of different municipalities enacting land use Jaws and with
few of these laws ever reaching the courts, those courts that are called upon to
construe these statutes and ordinances need as complete a factual record as possi
ble, so as to avoid making overly broad pronouncements.
Stein, supra note 1 1 , at 1 6 (citations omitted).
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Ability of Courts to Fashion Appropriate Remedies

Without a final decision by the government, federal courts may
have difficulty not only ascertaining arbitrary and capricious behavior
but also determining an appropriate remedy. This difficulty may extend
to both injunctive relief and damages. State courts, which have had
more occasions to decide remedies for arbitrary behavior by land use
regulators, usually hesitate to grant site-specific injunctive relief to
landowners out of fear of infringing on local legislative discretion.83 Al
though federal courts, like state courts, can choose from a range of op
tions for injunctive relief other than an order that permits immediate de
velopment,84 this choice may prove difficult to make and awkward to
implement.
More important, when calculating damages courts likely will en
counter significant problems in determining the extent of economic in
jury. One commentator prefers the measure of damages resulting from
due process claims brought by landowners because they are "more flex
ible than under takings jurisprudence" ; in due process claims damages
"need not be measured by the fair market value of the affected property
interest, but by the actual economic damage inflicted by the regula
tion. "85 Also, due process claims allow awards of punitive damages for
proof of "evil motive or intent."86 But determining "actual economic
damage" in the land use context is a burdensome task for courts. For a

83. See MANDELKER ET AL supra note 1, at 232-33 (discussing City of Rich
mond v. Randall, 211 S.E.2d 56 (1975)).
84. See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1504 (9th Cir. 1987), as
amended, 857 F.2d 567 (1988) (affirming injunctive relief invalidating local govern
ment's inconsistency determination, and awarding damages for delay, although injunc
tion provided "no guarantee that a development proposal will ultimately be approved");
MANDELKER ET AL supra note 1, at 233 (discussing alternatives to specific relief
such as invalidation of current zoning or remand to local decisionmaking authority for
reconsideration). Often, the nature of the plaintiff's allegations necessarily will make
possible only limited injunctive relief. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 7 1 6, 726
(11th Cir. 1990) (discussing hypothetical arbitrary rejection of landowner's application
for rezoning in which "the remedy . . . would not be an injunction requiring a grant of
commercial zoning, but rather would be the overturning of the arbitrary decision, possi
bly an injunction against similar irrational decisions, and other remedies depending on
the situation").
85. Stone & Seymour, supra note 4, at 1243; see also MANDELKER ET AL supra
note 1, at 189-90 (discussing advantages of remedies under § 1983).
86. See Stone & Seymour, supra note 4, at 1243; supra note 1 1 . However, puni
tive damages are not available against municipalities. See MANDELKER ET AL supra
note 1, at 190 (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 458 U.S. 247 (1981)).
.,

.,

.,

.,
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landowner deprived of a use to which she is entitled, a court must as
sess damages resulting from delays87 and lost opportunity costs.BB
A finality requirement may assuage the concern over assessing
damages in at least three ways. First, finality will provide more oppor
tunities for landowners and governments to reach compromises that in
practice might prove superior to remedies devised by courts.B9 In this
respect, finality serves as a prophylactic measure to ensure that all pre
sumably superior compromise solutions are first attempted. Second, fi
nality reveals a pattern of behavior on the part of individual government
agents such that courts can determine whether their conduct was so
egregious that punitive damages are justified. Last, by postponing litiga
tion, finality prevents claims involving only speculative future damages
- damages that are predicted to result from a denial of a particular use
of the property.90 Where plaintiffs allege harm inflicted by a lost oppor
tunity cost, the delay imposed by finality allows courts to focus, at least
in part, on a fixed period of time in which landowners have suffered
measurable, concrete injuries.91
However, the concern about the court's ability to determine an ap
propriate remedy does not support a finality requirement that includes
the reapplication component. Even if a landowner successfully were to
obtain permission on a second, less ambitious development proposal,
she most likely would continue to suffer harm resulting from the
wrongful denial of her original proposal. At least as a theoretical mat
ter, she should still be allowed to sue for the damages caused by ad
verse economic effects sustained as a result of not developing according
to the initial development proposal. This remaining governmental liabil
ity means that the reapplication requirement would not have advanced
87. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 190-91 (showing complicated na
ture of formula used by court in assessing damages for delays caused by arbitrary regu
latory behavior (citing Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 790 F. Supp. 909 (N.D. Cal.
1991))).
88. See, e.g., Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. Harris County, 89 F.3d 1481, 1489
(11th Cir. 1996) ( A person whose property is affected by [an invalid zoning classifica
tion] may recover damages for any injury the classification may have caused him
. . . ."); Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 1994).
89. See Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1291 (3d Cir.
1993) (noting that finality may be required for ripeness because "land-use regulation
generally affects a broad spectrum of persons and social interests, and . . . local political
bodies are better able than federal courts to assess the benefits and burdens of such leg
islation" (citation omitted)).
90. See Stone & Seymour, supra note 4, at 1234.
91. Cf. Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1988) (inter
preting Williamson County and MacDonald to require, for substantive due process
claims as well as takings claims, "a final decision by the government which inflicts a
concrete harm upon the plaintiff landowner").
"
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the goal of securing a presumably superior remedy - one that would
preclude further litigation in federal court - through negotiations be
tween the landowner and local government.
One might counterargue that as a practical matter the landowner
would hardly ever pursue litigation after receiving permission to de
velop according to a modified proposal, and that therefore the interest
in achieving a remedy through local negotiations continues to weigh
heavily in favor of a reapplication requirement. Moreover, the reappli
cation requirement would continue to advance the prudential interests in
revealing patterns of conduct by individual government agents for the
purpose of determining punitive damages, and in waiting until at least
some of the landowner's alleged injury is fixed and measurable.92 Nev
ertheless, because there remains the theoretical possibility that the land
owner may bring suit even if she receives permission to develop ac
cording to a modified proposal, the concern about judicial capacity to
determine remedies does not support the reapplication component as
strongly as it supports the initial application and variance components.

3.

Comity to State Institutions

The incorporation of the finality requirement into the ripeness stan
dard for substantive due process claims advances the normative goal of
allocating a reasonably significant sphere of responsibility to local offi
cials.93 State and local governments have traditionally exercised signifi
cant discretion with respect to land use issues.94 A meaningful ripeness
requirement supports the long-standing sense that allowing local gov
ernments a degree of flexibility in both creating land use regulations

92. See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1507 (9th Cir. 1987)
(fang, J., dissenting) (arguing that finality requirement should include reapplication
component because otherwise "damages are not calculable"; "Any verdict based upon
sheer speculation about the amount of damages is prone to be excessive because it is
not constrained by the appropriate measure of actual damages.").
93. See Nichol, supra note 23, at 178 (observing that ripeness "allows federal
courts to give due respect to the scope of responsibilities to other government decision
makers" and "limits any judicial proclivity to 'pre-empt and prejudge issues that are
committed for an initial decision to an administrative body or special tribunal' " (quot
ing Public Serv. Commn. v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 246 (1952))).
94. See Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d 1533, 1537 (1 1th Cir. 1995) ("Zoning pro
vides one of the firmest and most basic of the rights of local control." (citation omit
ted)); Tarlock, supra note 8, at 558; Armistead, supra note 6, at 794 (describing view
"that federal courts should stay out of local government decisions" because of "con
cern about both swelling litigation and overburdening local governments and officials
with damage awards and federal judicial interference").
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and adjudicating disputes is one important manifestation of the United
States' system of federalism.95
Moreover, a ripeness standard that includes a finality requirement
is consistent with existing Supreme Court doctrine that limits suits
against state officials under section 1983 in federal court.96 Through this
doctrine the Court has, according to one commentator, "preserve[d] its
vision of appropriate state-federal relations."97 The Court "is reluctant
to constitute the Due Process Clause as a font of tort law because to do
so would displace traditional state authority and thereby alter longstand
ing balances of power in the federal system. "98 Likewise, the finality
requirement provides local governments with a small but legitimate
sphere of flexibility in which to mediate competing interests in land use

95. See, e.g., Tari, 56 F.3d at 1537 (" [I]f a local investigator's issuance of a cita
tion was all that was necessary for a claim to ripen, the federal courts would become
'master zoning boards' in disputes which are best handled at the local level."); Eide v.
Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 726 n.1 7 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (arguing in favor of finality
requirement on ground that "zoning is a delicate area where a county's power should
not be usurped without giving the county an opportunity to consider concrete facts on
the merits prior to a court suit"); Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532
(9th Cir. 1988) (arguing that the ripeness requirements announced in Williamson County
and MacDonald are applicable to all constitutional claims, because they erect "impos
ing barriers . . . to guard against the federal courts becoming the Grand Mufti of local
zoning boards"), quoted in Stone & Seymour, supra note 4, at 1234; Mixon, supra note
15, at 708 ("Basic principles of federalism and orderly process would obviously be bet
ter served by deferring federal jurisdiction in land-use cases until claimants pursue and
exhaust available state remedies.").
96. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 309 (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart
Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 64647 (1989)).
97. Fallon, supra note 7, at 309.
98. Id. at 350. Professor Fallon goes so far as to say, in light of cases already de
cided by the Supreme Court, that federal courts should abstain altogether from hearing
substantive due process claims against state governments where the states themselves
provide adequate remedies through their judicial systems. See id. at 345 (arguing that
the Court's holding in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), that a state's provision of
adequate postdeprivation judicial remedies can negate an allegation that due process
was denied "would fit best into the surrounding doctrinal framework if it were
recharacterized as launching a body of federal abstention doctrine" for substantive due
process claims). That is not the argument here. The lower courts do not seem prepared
to take this route, see supra note 42, and other commentators have demonstrated why
abstention by federal courts for such claims should be discouraged. See Levinson, supra
note 6, at 356; Annistead, supra note 6, at 792-97 (arguing that permitting substantive
due process claims to proceed directly in federal court will not interfere with the pre
rogatives of local government because of the high standard of proof that must be met by
the plaintiff property owner). This said, to the extent the policy of maintaining federal
ism supports an abstention doctrine for substantive due process claims, it also applies to
the adoption for these claims of a ripeness doctrine that includes the finality
requirement.
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without fear of immediately incurring liability in federal court under
section 1983.
Again, however, this prudential concern justifies including the ini
tial application and variance components in the finality requirement but
not the reapplication component. Because the landowner theoretically
would still be able to sue for harm inflicted by the government's refusal
of the initial development proposal, even arrangements that allowed
landowners to develop their properties would remain subject to the su
pervision of federal courts.

4.

Judicial Economy

A court that grounds a ripeness test on judicial economy con
sciously defers adjudication of a dispute so as to conserve its judicial
resources for other controversies.99 The court essentially engages in a
cost-benefit analysis in order to maximize the value gained from judi
cial review across a broad spectrum of disputes.
Claims by landowners against local governments involving allega
tions of arbitrary and capricious behavior in the application of land use
regulations may be particularly susceptible to concerns about judicial
economy for at least two reasons. First, governments apply land use
regulations so often that the number of potential disputes is vast. Sec
ond, the disputes themselves are extremely fact-intensive, requiring sig
nificant expenditures of resources once they end up in court.
One might argue that concerns about judicial economy should be
of limited importance when constitutional rights are at stake. According
to this view, the effects on federal dockets of securing justice for consti
tutional violations are irrelevant. Courts have been clear, however, that
the sheer volume of the land use caseload necessitates interposing barri
ers to review. 1 00 Moreover, the Supreme Court and some lower federal
courts most likely had in mind these benefits of judicial economy in

99. See Stein, supra note 1 1 , at 1 3 n.37 (noting that "withholding of federal judi
cial intervention until the appropriate agency has completed its work . . . allows cases to
ripen with little or no expenditure of judicial resources").
100. See Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th
Cir. 1988) (refusing to rule on merits because court could not " imagine what zoning
dispute could not be shoehorned into federal court in this way, there to displace or post
pone consideration of some worthier object of federal judicial solicitude"); Scudder v.
Town of Glendale, 704 F.2d 999, 1 003 (7th Cir. 1983) (arguing that the " [a]vailability
of federal review of every zoning decision would only serve to further congest an al
ready overburdened court system").
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their varied overtures to the virtues of local "flexibility. " 10 1 Given the
variability of many local land use decisions, it would be wasteful for
federal courts to intervene when there is a good chance of the offensive
decision being reversed by a later administrative action. 1 02 However,
like the prudential concerns about determining appropriate remedies and
comity to local regulatory authorities, the judicial economy concern
does not justify expanding the finality requirement to include the reap
plication component, given that the development eventually permitted
as a result of the landowner's modified proposal does not erase all of
the local government's potential liability.
B.

Broad Prudential Concerns as Justification for Finality

Prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking in their totality
outweigh any harm to landowners inflicted by the initial application and
variance components of the finality requirement. A landowner who ob
tains permission to develop according to her original plans may sustain
some adverse effects from the delay associated with the normal process
ing of applications. 1 03 However, the finality requirement will enable fed
eral courts to assuage significantly concerns about their ability to assess
injury, their ability to determine appropriate remedies, comity to state
institutions, and judicial economy.
Prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking do not outweigh
harm to landowners inflicted by the reapplication component of the fi
nality requirement. The reapplication component would advance pru
dential concerns in two general respects. First, in many cases it would
continue to improve the factual records considered by courts. Second, in
some cases the reapplication component possibly would enable land
owners and local governments to reach compromises that preclude fur
ther litigation - despite the theoretical possibility of a remaining cause
of action - hence possibly easing courts' concerns about their ability

101. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 350
(1986); Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d at 498, 503 n.5
(9th Cir. 1990).
102. See Southern Pacific, 922 F.2d at 503 n.5 (observing that the flexibility of lo
cal zoning systems becomes "obviously useless if the property owners abandon their
applications after rejection by civil servants with narro w authority and before seeking
relief from a body with broader powers").
103. See, e.g., Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 796 F. Supp. 1320 (C.D. Cal.
1992), affd., 17 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1994); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 790 F.
Supp. 909 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd., 12 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1993). The landowner can hold
the government accountable for unreasonable delays. See, e.g., Urbanizadora Versalles,
Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1983); Eaton v. City of Solon, 598 F. Supp.
1505 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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to determine appropriate remedies, comity to state institutions, and judi
cial economy.
But to the extent the reapplication requirement furthers prudential
policies, courts must balance these policies against the hardship to the
party of withholding judicial review.104 It would be unfair to require
landowners to satisfy additional procedural requirements after the gov
ernment has arrived at a final decision on the use for which the land
owner is entitled.105 Although the reapplication component might make
sense for takings claims, where the injury alleged is the deprivation of
all substantial economically viable use of the property, it has no logical
connection to a substantive due process claim, where the injury alleged
is an arbitrary and capricious denial of a particular use. Even assuming
that substantive due process property rights are not as highly cherished
as other constitutional rights, courts should not gut them entirely for the

sake of prudential concerns, which in these cases would be only margi
nal and speculative.106

IV.

THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS TO FINALITY

Although prudential concerns about the importance of the as-ap
plied substantive due process claim and the accuracy, propriety, and ef
ficiency of judicial decisionmaking weigh in favor of a finality require
ment as a part of ripeness, one might still object to finality on four
grounds - two theoretical and two practical. The finality requirement
proposed in this Note might be challenged on the theoretical ground
that it violates the Supreme Court's holding in Patsy v. Florida Board
of Regents.107 Patsy held that plaintiffs bringing claims against state
governments under section 1983 in federal court are not required first to
exhaust state administrative remedies.108 A second objection, more prac
tical in nature, is that a finality requirement would impose a costly bu
reaucratic hurdle on middle class landowners and entrepreneurs who
might go bankrupt or simply give up before securing a judicial remedy
for arbitrary and capricious treatment by the government.109 The third
objection, which is related to the second, is that the ripeness doctrine

104. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
105. Cf. Kassouni, supra note 14, at 29 (suggesting limitations on the reapplica
tion requirement for takings cases given the "financial and emotional plight of property
owners").
106. Cf. Kassouni, supra note 14, at 7 (arguing that " [c]ourts should not draw ar
bitrary standards for determining when the impact of a regulation is significant enough
to rise to the level of a 'hardship' ").
107. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
108. See 457 U.S. at 516.
109. See generally Kassouni, supra note 14.

Michigan Law Review

522

[Vol. 95:492

encourages local governments to create administrative mechanisms for
relief that in effect benefit the wealthier and politically connected seg
ments of communities. The fourth objection - this one theoretical - is
that a conscious decision by a federal court to postpone decision on an
alleged violation of a constitutional right amounts to an abdication of

the court's responsibility. 110

The finality requirement stipulates that landowners cannot sue in
federal court after the first alleged instance of arbitrary and capricious
behavior; rather, they must take certain administrative steps to ensure
that the government has truly "acted." Hence, the components of final
ity can be challenged as so similar to the components of administrative
exhaustion that courts cannot require finality under Patsy.
In Williamson County, the Supreme Court held that the rule in
Patsy did not apply to the finality requirement for takings claims. The
Court's reasoning in Williamson County strongly suggests that Patsy
also does not apply to the finality requirement for substantive due pro
cess claims. In Williamson County, the Court characterized the finality
requirement as "concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has
arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual con
crete injury." l l l By contrast, the exhaustion requirement forbidden by
Patsy "refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an in
jured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a rem
edy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropri
ate." 112 Hence, although landowners bringing takings claims might have
to obtain a final decision by applying for a variance, they do not have
to use state procedures that "clearly are remedial" or that "result in a
judgment whether [the government's] actions violated any of [the land
owners'] rights." m
The "initial decisionmaker" theory used in Williamson County ap
plies to the finality requirement for substantive due process claims for
two reasons. First, both the government's decision on the landowner's
initial application and on her application for a variance can be con-

1 10. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 8, at 387 ("Despite section 1983 and the
Court's expression of civil rights actions belonging in court, landowners often find such
support to be meaningless rhetoric.").
1 1 1. Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 193 (1985).
1 12. 473 U.S. at 193.
1 13. This distinction, as applied to the case of the petitioner in Williamson County,
meant that he was not required to appeal the rejection by the county planning commis
sion of his preliminary plat application to the Board of Zoning Appeals, "because the
Board was empowered, at most, to review that rejection, not to participate in the Com
mission's decisionmaking." 473 U.S. at 193.
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strued as activities of the "initial decisionmaker." This interpretation of
the government's activities is consistent with the argument in Part II
that the government has not truly "acted" until it renders decisions on
the landowner's initial application and application for a variance. Sec
ond, courts have distinguished finality from exhaustion by noting that
the former "ensures that the issues and the factual components of the
dispute are sufficiently fleshed out to permit meaningful judicial re
view." 1 1 4 Hence, at least some of the prudential policies advanced by

the initial application and variance components - namely, the policies
of increasing the competence of federal courts to determine factual is
sues and assess damages - match those already used by courts to jus

tify

finality despite Patsy.
However, this Note's argument for a liberal construction of the va

riance requirement1 1 5 may initially appear to contradict the Court's
statement in Williamson County that landowners should not be required

to pursue appeals that "clearly are remedial" in nature.1 1 6 This apparent
contradiction may be reconciled for several reasons. Williamson County
should be read ·as carving out a broad exception to the holding in Patsy
for constitutional claims brought by landowners against local govern
ments under section 1983. Commentators have repeatedly noted the

similarity between the doctrines of ripeness and administrative exhaus
tion, especially where ripeness is based on prudential considerations,1 17

and the Supreme Court reaff'rrmed the independence of the doctrines
only in dicta.1 1 8 In fact, lower courts have given short attention to the
statement in Williamson County barring "remedial" administrative ap
peals in the land use context; they have not refrained from requiring
landowners to appeal decisions of governmental entities in order to

make their claims ripe for review.1 1 9

1 1 4. Bateman v. City of West Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 707 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fedn., 497 U.S. 871 (1990)).
1 15. The variance requirement means that a final decision should include appeals
by the landowner to all government agents with jurisdiction to pass judgment on the
landowner's original desired use. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
1 16. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193.
1 17. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3532.6, at 195.
1 18. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 1 92-93.
1 19. See, e.g., Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970, 976 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that
plaintiff had to appeal decision of county's Development and Licensing Division to
board of adjustment to make claim ripe); Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township,
983 F.2d 1285, 1290-93 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1993) (taking note of statement in Williamson
County that exhaustion of state remedies is not required for takings claims but neverthe
less holding that decision of zoning officer had to be appealed to hearing board before
landowner's substantive due process claims would be ripe for review); cf. Bateman v.
City of West Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 706 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding takings claim unripe
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This liberal construction of Williamson County's exception to Patsy
is buttressed by other Supreme Court decisions that appear to limit
Patsy's scope. The most important of these decisions is Parratt v. Tay
lor,120 in which the Court held that states do not deny due process to
plaintiffs who seek postdeprivation remedies for the loss of property as
a result of random and unauthorized acts of government officers, where
the state provides adequate postdeprivation redress.121 Although a later
case held that Parratt applies only to procedural due process viola
tions,122 a Seventh Circuit panel deciding a substantive due process
claim recently reasoned that just as "[t]he Parratt doctrine had already
created one exception to the principle that exhaustion of state remedies
is not required in a federal civil rights suit . . Williamson created an
other."123 One commentator goes even further in his interpretation of
Parratt by arguing that the case should be viewed as creating an absten
tion doctrine for certain substantive due process claims.124
Finally, Patsy itself arguably should not apply to substantive due
process claims arising in the land use context. Patsy involved an allega
tion by an employee of a state university that the university had dis
criminated against her on account of race and gender. It is debatable
whether the Patsy Court intended its holding to extend to every other
species of constitutional claim under section 1983, particularly claims
by plaintiffs who do not allege that they have suffered injury as a result
of being a member of a discrete and insular minority.125 Furthermore,
commentators have speculated whether the Patsy Court "confuse[d] the
.

because plaintiff failed to appeal issuance of certificate of noncompliance to city board
of adjustment).
120. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
121. See 451 U.S. at 543-44.
122. See Zinennon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 1 13, 125 (1990).
123. Gamble v. Eau Claire County, 5 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.)
(holding unripe landowner's due process takings claim); see also Mixon, supra note 15,
at 713 (arguing for a broad interpretation of Parratt in the context of due process claims
arising out of land use decisions). But see Levinson, supra note 6, at 350 (arguing de
spite Parratt that substantive due process "focuses on whether the government has
abused its power, and any violation is complete as soon as the act is committed").
124. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 344 ("When the Court's confusions are stripped
away, Parratt held that there could be no federal remedy for the alleged substantive due
process violation if a federally adequate scheme of remedies existed in state court.");
supra note 98.
Patsy is also limited by Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary, 454
U.S. 100 (1981), in which the Supreme Court held that federal courts, for reasons of
comity, should not decide claims seeking remedies from state taxation, as long as the
state provides remedies that are plain, adequate, and complete. See HART & WECHS
LER, supra note 60, at 1352.
125. See Stein, supra note 1 1, at 14 & n.47.
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question of exhaustion of state remedies in general . . . with the ques
tion of exhaustion of distinctively administrative remedies." 126 The fi
nality requirement proposed in this Note - one which requires only ad
ministrative appeals that pertain directly to the landowner's initial
development proposal - would gain additional support from reading
Patsy to bar only "state remedies in general."
The practical concern for middle class property owners, especially
those forced to negotiate with grossly unresponsive government offi
cials who have political incentives to engage in arbitrary and capricious
behavior, should not lightly be dismissed. Against this concern, how
ever, one must consider the implications of failing to give flexibility to
local governments to create and administer land use regulations. Sub
jecting local governments to potential liability for every alleged in
stance of wrongful behavior would encourage well-capitalized develop
ers to use the threat of lawsuit to impose unwanted or illegal
development plans on communities, regardless of the standard of con
duct of the responsible government entity. The extension of the finality
requirement to substantive due process claims recognizes, as one com
mentator notes, "the real world interplay between developer and regula
tor." 127 Furthermore, the threat of government over-reaching must be
balanced against the evolving view that an individual parcel of real
property is not just "a commodity" to be "intensively developed" and
protected from "forced redistribution" by the state, but part of a larger
ecological resource that should be protected by environmental land use
regulation.128 Finally, for situations involving obvious bad faith on the
part of governments, federal courts can use the futility exception to ex
cuse certain components of finality and do justice in a given case.
The other practical objection to ripeness focuses not on the barriers
it poses to the middle class, but on the opportunities for certain land
owners to receive preferential treatment. According to this argument,
the more that land use decisionmaking becomes an ad hoc enterprise,
the more certain individuals within communities will be able to use
their wealth and influence to turn the variety of administrative processes
to their advantage. Not only does this greater potential for corruption

126. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 1351 (comparing Patsy with the
"Court's careful articulation of the judge-made rule that, subject to some limited excep
tions, administrative remedies must be exhausted in suits challenging federal adminis
trative action").
127. Lyman, supra note 50, at 104 n.12 (arguing for a uniform fmality require
ment for takings and substantive due process claims).
128. Tarlock, supra note 8, at 586, 595.
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create an equal protection problem, but it also threatens to undermine
the possibility of coherent land use planning.1 29
However, it seems late in the day to speculate on whether local
governments will engage in greater ad hoc decisionmaking as a result
of the ripeness doctrine. Administrative processes allowing for case-by
case application of land use policies already have entrenched them
selves in the ordinances of most local governments. 130 Even if the ripe
ness requirement were relaxed for most jurisdictions, this would not
prevent certain members of communities from utilizing already existing
administrative processes to gamer preferential treatment. In other
words, ripeness only makes administrative processes mandatory; the ab
sence of ripeness would do nothing to prevent the voluntary use of
these processes by individuals and developers who deem it in their in
terests to do so.
As for the contention that courts must demonstrate equal vigilance
for all alleged constitutional injuries, this position belies a misunder
standing of the role of federal courts in a modem administrative state.
Violations of constitutional rights do not give rise to an immediate
cause of action in federal courts. The modem law governing rights to
judicial review and rights to judicial remedies, as one commentator puts
it, "den[ies] any absolute individual right to judicially dispensed correc
tive justice." 131 It has a much more modest goal, which is to "affirm [] a
supervening, quasi-managerial social interest in maintaining mecha
nisms of judicial oversight that are adequate to keep government gener
ally, albeit not perfectly, within the bounds of law. " 132

V.

CONCLUSION

Land use regulation has long played a vital role in maximizing the
welfare of communities. Not only does it contribute to health and safety
and improve aesthetics, but increasingly it helps protect valuable envi
ronmental resources.133 These functions are becoming more important as
time goes on. The shift in emphasis in environmental regulation from
controlling toxic risks to preserving biodiversity will, as one commenta-

129. Accord MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1 , at 448-49 (observing that under
certain conditions "zoning becomes a discretionary decisionmaking process rather than
a system in which land uses are permitted as-of-right"); id. at 492 (noting a potential
equal protection argument in cases of "spot zoning").
130. See id. at 197 (describing content of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act,
which has been substantially integrated into most state legislation).
131. Fallon, supra note 7, at 339.
132. Id. at 339; cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 1346-47 (summarizing
virtues of judicial discretion).
133. See supra text accompanying note 13.

November 1996]

Note-Substantive Due Process

527

tor puts it, "place new environmental protection responsibilities and op
portunities on local governments, the front line resource management
units."134 Land use regulations also allow local governments to comply
with state growth management statutes, which states are enacting in in
creasing number.135
An underdeveloped ripeness standard that allows landowners to
bring substantive due process claims against local governments upon
the first manifestation of alleged arbitrary and capricious behavior
would needlessly escalate the potential liability for governments. Fear
of increased liability, in turn, would threaten the implementation of es
sential regulatory activities. Such a threat would be imposed for the
sake of a constitutional right which, although deserving of some judicial
scrutiny, would arguably distract courts from attending to worthier com
plaints that are better suited for federal judicial resolution.
The requirement that landowners obtain a final decision on their
desired land use before suing in federal court helps alleviate litigation
pressures on land use regulators. Courts should impose this finality re
quirement on two theories. First, by holding that governments do not in
fact "act" until they issue a final decision, courts would be redefining
the cause of action for violations of substantive due process in the same
way that the Supreme Court has redefined the cause of action for tak
ings claims. Second, courts should require finality to satisfy concerns
about their own roles as decisionmakers. Courts appropriately assume
that they have only a "quasi-managerial" interest in protecting land
owners from arbitrary and capricious treatment by government agents
applying use regulations.136 It is upon this relatively modest role as a
broad overseer of property rights that the future of desirable land use
planning and ecological protection, not to mention wise judicial deci
sionmaking, may depend.

134. Tarlock, supra note 8, at 556.
135. See Jeffrey M. Eustis, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Growth Management
Act Implementation that Avoids Takings and Substantive Due Process Limitations, 16 U.
PuGET SOUND L. REv. 1 181 (1993) (describing goals of Washington State's Growth
Management Act of 1991 and the consequent legal challenges to local governments
under takings and substantive due process doctrines); see generally Eide v. Sarasota
County, 908 F.2d 716 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (ruling against landowner who challenged appli
cation of comprehensive plan adopted by Sarasota County, Florida, to comply with the
state's Local Government Planning and Development Regulation Act).
136. Cf. Tarlock, supra note 8, at 563 (arguing that "it is difficult but possible to
integrate the 'imperatives' of biodiversity protection with the protection of individual
rights within the framework of federal constitutional law and local government regula
tory authority").

